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Remedies Against Incomplete, Erroneous and
Unclear International Arbitral Awards
Ilias Bantekas†
Ikram Ullah††
Abstract
There is a clear body of transnational law emerging from Article
33 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Model Law. Parties to an arbitral dispute may seek
correction and interpretation of an award, within the time limits
(usually 30 days) set by statute and the object of the request must be
targeted against a slip (computational, typographical or similar
mistake) or an oversight in the award. Anything beyond a slip or an
oversight that effectively targets the thought process of the
arbitrators cannot be amenable to the process of correction under
Article 33. Hence, a conscious “mistake” by the tribunal does not
constitute an error under Article 33 but an appeal against the
arbitrators’ personal judgment or knowledge, which is
unacceptable. In equal measure, such a mistake would not usually
give rise to a ground for setting the award aside. A much more
contentious issue is whether the courts and the tribunal itself possess
authority to extend the time lines for making an application for
correction or interpretation. There seems to be emerging consensus
that if there is agreement between the parties, such consent serves
as an exception to the functus officio nature of the tribunal. The same
considerations apply mutatis mutandis in respect of requests for an
additional award, the aim of which is to address claims that the
tribunal omitted to address in its original award.
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I. Introduction
It is not uncommon for awards to suffer from lack of clarity or
be riddled with mistakes1 that render them problematic in terms of
enforcement. Arbitrators often draft large awards consisting of
many complex claims and can be overwhelmed and ultimately
commit several errors such as forgetting to address all claims,
mistaking the names of the winning parties, or making wrong
calculations.2 Such awards may still be enforced, but will prejudice

1 See Cecilia M. Di Cio, Dealing with Mistakes Contained in Arbitral Awards, 12
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 121, 121 (2001). Awards may suffer from mistakes in several ways,
including also translation failures. See generally id. at 121 (stating that there are “errors
that are ‘ministerial’—for example, typographical or clerical mistakes”).
2 Mistakes are also common in investor-state arbitral awards, as well as inter-state
disputes handled by judicial entities such as the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and
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the rights of the parties. It is therefore crucial that when an award is
rendered, the parties scrutinize the award in as much detail as
possible because there are strict time limits for requesting its
correction and adding new content, particularly in respect to claims
not contemplated by the tribunal in the original award.3 The process
of correcting arbitral awards is not straightforward, although its
rationale is undisputed.4 This is due to the fine line between
revision, interpretation, correction, and remedies against awards,
which are treated akin to annulments or appeals on points of law
and facts.5 Indeed, the first type of remedy, the subject matter of
this article, is not meant to serve as a disguised appeal against
mistakes of law or fact in the body of the award.6 Mistakes of law
and fact which are predicated on the arbitrators’ personal judgment
are not susceptible to an appeal or similar remedy unless they
constitute grounds for annulment under the law of the seat.7 Hence,
tribunals and courts faced with requests for revision, interpretation,
and correction of an international arbitral award must ensure the
sought remedy is directed against a true oversight in the award.8 No
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”). See e.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. et. al.
v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/04/05, Decision on the Requests for Correction,
Supplementary Decision and Interpretation (Jul. 10 2008); see Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad,
Interpretation and Revision of International Boundary Decisions, part III, sec. 5
(Cambridge Univ, Press 2007).
3 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art.
33(1),(3), UNCITRAL, U.N. Doc A/40/17 (Jun. 21 1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model
Code].
4 See generally Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards,
6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 56, 106 (2014) (stating that there is a “longstanding rule that
courts should confirm awards without determining whether they are legally-correct”).
5 See generally id. at 106 (stating that “the law on vacating legally-erroneous
arbitration awards [is] . . . sorely deficient”). Of course, awards may be annulled for a
variety of other procedural reasons, such as improper notice. See Ilias Bantekas, Receipt
of Written Communications in International Commercial Arbitration, 31 AM. REV. INT’L.
ARB. 85, 96 (2021).
6 See Jason Fry et al., THE SECRETARIAT’S GUIDE TO ICC ARBITRATION (Int’l Chamber
of Com. 2012) 349. “Article 35(2) does not provide a means of appeal. It does not permit
the arbitral tribunal to review the substance of its reasoning or deal with additional claims
or arguments. It is limited to situations involving clear errors or vague language.” Id.
7 See generally id. at 351 (“Many applications for interpretation amount to
attempted appeals aimed at . . . attempting to have the arbitral tribunal reconsider its
decision or the evidence. Article 35(2) does not empower an arbitral tribunal to revise the
outcome or reasoning of its award.”).
8 See id. at 351. “Most arbitral tribunals find that to be admissible a request for
interpretation must seek to clarify the meaning of an operative part of the arbitral tribunal’s
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doubt, there will be times when such a distinction is far from clear.
The current practice is predicated on the elaboration of this
limited remedy in Article 33 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration. Article 33 allows any of the
parties, but usually the party with an interest in correcting the award,
to request the tribunal to correct it or to offer an interpretation that
leads to greater clarity and precision.9 Given that tribunals become
functus officio once their mandate expires, or when the time limits
for set aside proceedings come to an end, it is crucial that the parties
observe the pertinent limits for making requests for correction
and/or interpretation.10 If they fail to do so, then they are unable to
turn to the tribunal that issued the award, but exceptionally they may
be allowed to approach the courts of the seat at a later date. 11 In
equal manner, the parties may be allowed under certain institutional
rules to approach the Court of their chosen institution or the courts
of the seat at a later date with a view to offering the same service,
even if the tribunal is functus officio.12 This practice is, however,
exceptional because of the expectation of parties to arbitration
having access to experienced counsel who can read the award
immediately after it is issued and can hence advise their clients if
something is unclear or incorrect.13 Article 33 of the Model Law
has not only acted as a catalyst for a uniform approach to the
correction, interpretation, and revision of arbitral awards, but it has
also provided an impetus for consistent judgments in both Model

decision.” Id. Therefore, requests for interpretation should generally target the dispositive
section of the award or other parts that directly affect the dispositive section or the parties’
rights and obligations.” Id.
9 See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 3, at art. 33(a-b).
10 See id. at art. 32 (explaining the “Termination of proceedings” and “Correction
and interpretation of award”). Exceptionally, however, the parties may, through mutual
consent, extend the period of an arbitrator’s authority to issue correctional, interpretational
or additional award. Pirtek (U.K.) Ltd. v. Deanswood Ltd. [2005] EWHC 2301, ¶ 20
(appeal taken from U.K. Com. Court). Pirtek (U.K.) Ltd. found any additional award for
interest had to be made within 56 days of the date of the original award, unless the parties
agreed a longer period. Id. at ¶ 37. In Pirtek (UK) Ltd., an additional award on interest was
requested seventeen months after the original award was set aside because, inter alia, that
the request had not been lodged by mutual consent. Id. at ¶ 33, 42.
11 Article 33 does not allow for returning to the arbitration tribunal after the time
limit expires. See UNCITRAL Model Code, supra note 3, at art. 32-34.
12 This is explained further below. But see Thomas H. Webster, Functus Officio and
Remand in International Arbitration, 27 ASA BULL. 441, 441 (2009).
13 See sections 8.1 and 8.2 of this paper below for an analysis of this issue.
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Law jurisdictions, non-Model Law states, as well as institutional
laws.14 It is this article’s belief that the vast majority of judgments
in this field have been influenced or predicated on the dictates of
Article 33. As a result, our analysis will focus on Article 33 and
pertinent developments around the world that are the direct or
indirect result of its impact and influence. It is therefore important
to provide the text of Article 33 at this juncture:
(1) Within thirty days of receipt of the award, unless another
period of time has been agreed upon by the parties:
(a) a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral
tribunal to correct in the award any errors in computation, any
clerical or typographical errors or any errors of similar nature;
(b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other
party, may request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of
a specific point or part of the award.
If the arbitral tribunal considers the request to be justified, it shall
make the correction or give the interpretation within thirty days
of receipt of the request. The interpretation shall form part of the
award.
(2) The arbitral tribunal may correct any error of the type referred
to in paragraph (1)(a) of this article on its own initiative within
thirty days of the date of the award.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to
the other party, may request, within thirty days of receipt of the
award, the arbitral tribunal to make an additional award as to
claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the
award. If the arbitral tribunal considers the request to be justified,
it shall make the additional award within sixty days.
(4) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if necessary, the period of
time within which it shall make a correction, interpretation or an
additional award under paragraph (1) or (3) of this article.
(5) The provisions of article 31 shall apply to a correction or
interpretation of the award or to an additional award.15

14 See G.A. Res. 65/22, at art. 38 (2010) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules];
see ICC, ICC Arbitration Rules 2017 & 2021 – Compared Version, art. 36 (Jan. 2021); see
LCIA, LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 27 (2014). This clearly corresponds with the intended
public interest of what is otherwise a private means of dispute settlement. See Ilias
Bantekas, The Public Interest Perspective of International Courts and Tribunals, 38 ARIZ.
J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 61, 63 (2021).
15 UNCITRAL Model Code, supra note 3, at art. 33.
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The Article is organized under the following sections; Section 2
will explore the travaux (preparatory works) of the Model Law,
particularly its 1985 version, where Article 33 was first adopted.
This will be followed by Section 3, the legal nature of the relevant
claims, as well as the precise meaning of requests to correct and
interpret awards in Sections 4 and 5 respectively, and the tribunals’
proprio motu (at the tribunal’s own initiative) powers in this respect
in Section 6. Section 7 will deal with requests for additional awards
in respect of claims not contemplated or omitted from the final
award. Although additional awards are not always included in
discussions on correction and interpretation, this paper takes a
different view, chiefly because claims for an additional award are
effectively claims for correction of an incomplete award.16 Section
8 examines the delicate issue of available timelines for challenging
technically faulty awards and whether the tribunal or the courts are
best suited for this purpose.
II. Travaux Preparatoires
Article 33 sets out the conditions warranting a correction,
interpretation, and the making of an additional award.17 During the
initial drafting process, there was uncertainty regarding the need for
the Model Law to deal with various types of awards.18 However,
later the negotiators were convinced the Model Law should deal
with this issue and the Preparatory Commission (working on the
Model Law) affirmed this position by ordering that in “preparing
the model law due account be taken of the 1958 New York
Convention and of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.”19 As to the
particular point concerning the various types of awards, it was
desired that if various types of awards were to be encompassed
under the Model Law, the arbitrator should be entitled to make those
awards only on the request of the parties.20 A fixed standard time
period, as followed in national laws, was considered good practice,

See infra Section 6.
See UNCITRAL Model Code, supra note 3, at art. 33.
18 See Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. on the Work of its Fourteenth
Session, U.N. Doc. A/36/17, ¶¶ 40-42 (Jun. 26, 1981).
19 Id. at ¶ 65.
20 See U.N. Secretary-General, Possible Features of a Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/207, ¶ 82 (May 14 1981).
16
17
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despite the difficulty of regulating such time limits uniformly.21
However, it was stipulated that if the standard time is laid down, it
should be coupled with “an elaborate mechanism for extensions.”22
It was stressed that it was necessary to give parties a right to seek
correction of errors in awards, or a right to seek interpretation or the
issuance of additional awards, in line with the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules’ provision on that subject.23 At this point in time,
although such provision was considered of limited significance, its
inclusion was favored with an aim to “overcome any problems
arising from the fact that the mandate of the arbitral tribunal is
terminated by making the award.”24
At first, the Working Group kept its deliberations within the
confines of “final, interim, interlocutory, and partial” awards and its
list of questions did not include the issue of additional awards.25 In
fact, there were divergent views on inclusion within the Model
Law.26 While its inclusion was opposed by one view, the opposing
view considered the mere enumeration of types of arbitral awards
as insufficient and instead, “legal qualifications and consequences
of different types, including possible means of recourse and
enforceability” should have been specified.27 Generally, the
participants agreed the parties were at liberty to prescribe time limits
for the arbitrator for purposes of making an arbitral awards, and the
Model Law should refrain from setting such time limits and dealing
ramifications for the expiry thereof, owing to obvious considerable
variations of circumstances in international arbitration.28
Later general consensus also developed on the inclusion of
“provisions concerning the correction and interpretation of
award.”29 Such provision was thought to be “modelled on articles

See id. at ¶ 84.
Id.
23 See id. at ¶ 93.
24 Id. at ¶ 93.
25 Comm’n. on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of the Working Grp. on Int’l Cont. Prac. on the
Work of its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/232, ¶ 135 (Nov. 10, 1982) [hereinafter
Report for the Working Fourth Session].
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 See id. at ¶ 74.
29 Id. at ¶ 98.
21
22
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35 and 36 of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.”30 Focusing on the
avoidance of possible abuses and delay, confinement of requests for
interpretation to specific points was considered very necessary.31 At
the same time, provisions dealing with the correction and
interpretation of the award (Article 34) were striving to keep the
arbitrator’s mandate intact “in cases of awards which do not settle
the dispute in full.”32
Czechoslovakia proposed that the interpretation under Article
33 should be confined to the “interpretation of the reasons upon
which the award is based.”33 However, the German Democratic
Republic’s proposal was that the Model Law should not deal with
the possibility of interpretation of award.34 But a general consensus
developed in favor of affording the arbitral tribunal the right to
“correct any errors in computation, any clerical or typographical
errors, or any errors of similar nature as provided in paragraph
(1)(a), and that the parties should not be able to stipulate to the
contrary” by keeping a 30-day time period with non-mandatory
character.35
Although the party’s right to request interpretation of the award
was not made subject to the parties’ agreement to the contrary, there
was no agreement as to whether the arbitrator’s interpretation in
response to the party’s request should become part of the award.36
On the face of different types of awards, it was noted that limitation
periods for “attacking” an arbitral award in court should be
harmonized.37
The divergent view prevailed on the question of whether certain
timelines should be prescribed to mandate the arbitrator to dispose
of the requests for interpretation and correction of awards. 38 The
Id.
See id.
32 Comm’n. on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of the Working Grp. on Int’l Cont. Prac. on the
Work of its Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/216, ¶ 73 (Mar. 23, 1982).
33 U.N. Secretary-General, Analytical compilation of comments by Gov’ts and int’l
orgs. on the draft text of a model l. on int’l com. arb., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263, art. 33 ¶ 1
(Mar. 19 1985) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary General Report].
34 See id. at art. 33 ¶ 2.
35 Report of the Working Fourth Session, supra note 25 at ¶ 178.
36 See id. at ¶ 179.
37 See id. at ¶ 182.
38 See Comm’n. on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. of the Working Grp. on Int’l Cont Prac. on
the Work of its Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/246, ¶ 122 (Mar. 6 1984).
30
31
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view opposing such timelines was supported with arguments “that
there may be circumstances in which the arbitral tribunal would be
unable, for good reasons, to comply with a fixed time-limit.”39 This
would potentially “create uncertainty as to the validity of actions
taken after their expiration and would raise questions as to the
sanction for non-compliance.”40
Although the other view did not favor strict timelines, it
supported the prescription of a general formula under which the
arbitrator would be required to act “promptly” and “without
delay.”41 However, the Working Group went for compromise by
furnishing fixed timelines.42 To that end, the arbitrator was to render
correction and interpretation within 30 days of receipt of request
and an additional award within sixty days of the request.43 Section
33 also conferred power on the arbitrator “to extend the thirty- and
sixty-day period, if necessary . . . “44 This time period was to
commence after the receipt of the request and was suggested that,
after the respective time periods, the words “of receipt of the
request” be added in the text of the provision, but this suggestion
did not receive sufficient acceptance.45
It was also noted that notice of request for correction,
interpretation, or additional award, should also come from the
requesting party to the other party to afford him or her an
opportunity to express their views thereon.46 “It was suggested that
a reasonable period of time during which that party could reply
should be taken into account for the calculation of the period of time
which the arbitral tribunal should dispose of the request.”47 Sweden
and the United States proposed mandating the arbitrator who, upon
receipt of a request from a party, should afford the other party an
opportunity to be heard.48 Although the Swedish proposal did not
expressly refer to additional awards, the United States’ proposal was

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 119.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 121.
Id. at ¶ 122.
See id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 123.
See id. at ¶ 124.
Id.
See U.N. Secretary General Report, supra note 33, at art. 33(3).
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with regard “to all three cases of action . . . (i.e. correction,
interpretation of the award and additional award).”49 However,
Sweden considered a 30-day period too short for both “a response
to a request under . . . Article [33] and for the ensuing action by the
arbitral tribunal.”50 The United States proposed the 30-day time
period should commence after the submission of reply from the
other party on request for correction, interpretation of the award, or
additional award.51 For this purpose, the Working Group relied on
the wisdom of the arbitrator to give reasonable time to the other
party, and for that reason did not prescribe any timeline for the other
party’s reply.52
On the point of an additional award, the Working Group first
thought to include in the provision that the arbitral tribunal could be
empowered to render an additional award only where to render such
award there would be no need for evidence and a hearing.53 But that
idea was abandoned because “it was unduly restrictive in that it
excluded a considerable number of cases where at least a hearing, if
not further evidence, was necessary before making the additional
award.”54
III. The Legal Nature of Claims
Once the award is made, it becomes final and binding and
cannot become the subject of a request for correction, interpretation,
or addition under Article 33 of the Model Law.55 This is because
the mandate of the tribunal is considered to have ended after the
pronouncement of an award and the completion of arbitration
proceedings.56 When the arbitrator becomes functus officio
(expiration of mandate) he or she cannot reopen the disputed claims,
Id.
Id.
51 See id.
52 UN Doc. A/CN.9/246, supra note 38 at ¶ 122.
53 See id., at ¶ 125.
54 Id.
55 See Tay Eng Chuan v. United Overseas Ins. Ltd., [2009] SGHC 193 (Sing. High
Ct.); Trade & Transp., Inc. v. Nat. Petroleum Charterers Inc., 931 F.2d 191, 193-94 (2d
Cir. 1991); Loc. P-9, United Food & Com. Workers Int’l Union v. George A. Hormel &
Co., 776 F.2d 1393, 1395 (8th Cir. 1985); Todd Petroleum Mining Co. Ltd. v. Shell
(Petroleum Mining) Co. Ltd., [2014] NZCA 507 at [¶ 34] (N.Z.); Torch Offshore LLC v.
Cable Shipping Inc., [2004] EWHC 787 [28] (Appeal taken from U.K. Com).
56 See UNCITRAL Model Code, supra note 3, at art. 32(1).
49
50
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or revisit the issues in the award that have already been decided. 57
However, this presumption is subject to exceptions for the purposes
of correction, interpretation of the award, and the making of an
additional award.58 Many senior courts correctly claim that requests
for correction, clarification, and interpretation (of ambiguous
awards) constitute an exception to the regular functus officio of
tribunals, but they have not clarified whether the serious grounds
for such exception equally justify an extension of the statutory time
limits.59
Therefore, requests for correction, interpretation, and additional
awards can only be satisfied before the award is clad with finality.
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Todd Petroleum Mining60
emphasized that normally the termination of arbitration proceedings
brings the mandate of arbitrators to an end, this being the point at
which the award becomes final.61 However, Article 33 of the Model
Law functions to extend this mandate in three ways: first, to correct
outstanding errors; second, to interpret some aspect of the award;
and third, to produce an additional award.62 In Popack v. Lipszyc,63
the Ontario Court of Appeal considered when an award becomes
binding for the purposes of enforcement. In August of 2013, the
arbitrator in the case made an award in favor of the appellants at a
significantly lower amount than what was sought by the appellants,
who proceeded to set aside the award on the basis that the arbitrator
had followed an improper procedure.64 Upon dismissal, the
See Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 991 (3rd Cir. 1997).
See Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co. 943 F.2d 327, 334 (3rd Cir.
1991); La Vale Plaza Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, 378 F.2d 569, 573 (3d Cir. 1967); UNCITRAL
Model Code, supra note 3, at art. 33(3).
59 Several United States Circuit courts are unanimous in recognizing such an
exception where an arbitral award “fails to address a contingency that later arises or when
the award is susceptible to more than one interpretation.” See Sterling China Co. v. Glass,
Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Loc. No. 24, 357 F.3d 546, 554 (6th Cir.
2004); see also Brown v. Witco Corp., 340 F.3d 209, 219 (5th Cir. 2003); Gen. Re Life
Ins. Co. v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 273 F.Supp.3d 307, 315 (2nd Cir. 2018).
60 Todd Petroleum Mining Co., [2014] NZCA 507 [17 Oct. 2014].
61 It is contested whether the time limits for an award to become final begin at the
moment all arbitrators sign it, or whether the majority signs it. See Ilias Bantekas, The
Requirement of Signed and Dated Awards: Are Arbitrators Ever Entitled not to Sign?,
39(3) ASA BULL. 642 (2021).
62 See UNCITRAL Model Code, supra note 3, at art. 33.
63 See Popack v. Lipszyc, 2018 ONCA 635.
64 Id. at [4].
57
58
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appellants asked the respondents to pay the costs as awarded by the
arbitrator.65 However, the respondent filed an application to the
arbitrator to lower the costs of the award, as a matter of the
additional costs incurred by the appellants’ annulment
proceedings.66 Subsequently, the appellants filed to enforce the
award under Articles 35 and 36 of the Model Law.67 At the same
time, the respondent applied for stay of enforcement, asserting that
because the award was not yet binding, the arbitrator had no
authority to decide costs.68 The court stated that the respondent’s
claim did not concern an error falling within the purview of Article
33 and that the intention of the respondent was based on an event
that occurred after the award was made; thus, it raised a new issue
for the tribunal.69 The court referred to Article 32(1) of the Model
Law, which states that “arbitral proceedings are terminated by the
final award,”70 as well as Article 33(3), which provides that the
“mandate of the arbitral tribunal terminates with the termination of
the arbitral proceedings, subject to the provisions of articles 33 and
34 (4)”;71 that is, “subject to a request for a correction or
interpretation of an award, an additional award, or a suspension of
setting aside proceedings by a court.”72 The court then held that the
award was final, demanded the parties release each other from other
obligations, and did not indicate any other issues needing further
consideration.73 The court also highlighted that neither party had
asked the arbitrator to include the litigation costs in the award.74
Even if they had made such an application, they did not follow the
requisite timelines given in Article 33(1) and 33(3).75 The court
held that the request to consider the inclusion of costs “does not
See id. ¶¶ 4–5.
See id.
67 See id. ¶ 5.
68 Id. ¶¶ 6–23.
69 See id. ¶¶ 67–69.
70 Article 32 – Termination of Proceedings (1985), UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
INT’L COM. ARB., [https://perma.cc/H96S-RJD2] (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
71 Commercial Arbitration and Other Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods –
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, SICE,
[https://perma.cc/JU8D-B4L7] (last visited Oct 16, 2021).
72 See Popack, 2018 ONCA 635 [75].
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
65
66
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involve a matter of correction or an additional award ‘as to claims
presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award’
within the meaning of Art. 33 of the Model Law. It is a request to
adjudicate a new issue.”76 The court also held that, with respect to
recognizing an arbitral award, the jurisdiction lies with the court and
not with the arbitrator to decide if the award is binding.77
IV. Errors Amenable to Corrections
Any of the parties may request the arbitrators to correct
typographical or calculation errors in awards, often referred to as
“slips,” as well as any injustice caused by an oversight, such as an
unconscious omission.78 Some jurisdictions, particularly provinces
within federal states, limit the ambit of permitted corrections to
slips, thus excluding oversights.79 Article 33 of the Model Law
cannot be used to correct mistakes in the arbitrator’s reasoning;80 a
request for correction is not a substitute for setting an award aside.81
The slip must “be an error affecting the expression of the arbitrator’s
thought.”82 Where the award mistook the plaintiff as the defendant
in at least two places, this was viewed as a clerical slip.83 Slips may
relate to an arithmetic error, such as the calculation of interest due,84
or a failure to account for a deposit that had been made by one of

Id. ¶ 81.
Id. ¶ 84 (citing Dalimpex Ltd. v. Janicki, 2003 CanLII 34234, para. 47 (ON CA)).
78 Art. 43(1) Alberta Arbitration Act; see also Dawson v. Dawson, 2016 ABQB 167
[46] (CanLII).
79 The British Columbia Arbitration Act is a prime example of such a jurisdiction.
80 Hence, where the tribunal issued an addendum to an award because it had failed
to consider the relief claimed, this was held to fall outside the limited scope of Art. 33(1)(a)
of the Model Law. Such relief could be only become available through an application for
an additional award under Art. 33(3) of the Model Law. See SC v. OE1 [2020] HKCFI
2065 ¶ 27–32. See also CNH Glob. NV v. PGN Logistics Ltd. [2009] 1 CLC 807.
81 See McLean Homes S. E. Ltd. v. Blackdale Ltd., [2001] ArbLR 38; Ircon Int’l Ltd.
v. Budhiraja Mining & Constr. Ltd., 2007(4) ARBLR 159 (Delhi High Court) (2007)
(India).
82 See Sutherland & Co. v. Hannevig Bros Ltd., [1921] 1 KB 336, at 341.
83 See Tay Eng Chuan v. United Overseas Ins. Ltd., [2009] SGHC 193. The
Singapore High Court was asked to correct four other “slips.” It found these to pertain to
substantive findings of the tribunal, thereby holding they were only amenable to an appeal
process, as only technical or non-substantive errors are amenable to correction.
84 See Fat Cat Farms Ltd. v. Wolfe, 2017 MBQB 76 [57] (affirmed in 2017 MBCA
124).
76
77
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the parties.85 For instance, in an award relying on the existence of
20,266 tons of soybeans, instead of 120,266 tons, the discrepancy
was held to amount to a clerical mistake.86 In another case, the key
issue was the fuel consumption of a vessel.87 The owner and
charterer submitted evidence showing 7 and 4.5 tons of fuel
consumption, respectively.88 The award relied on the charterer’s
evidence, but mistakenly used the owner’s figures, and as a result
ordered the charterer to pay much more than expected. The court
remitted the award to the arbitrator,89 emphasizing that if the
request for correction relates to “an error in the thought process
itself,” it cannot be corrected.90 The English Court of Appeal drew
a distinction between having “second thoughts or intentions and
correcting an award or judgment to give true effect to first thoughts
or intentions”: it is thus impossible to correct a wrong assessment
of evidence or misconstruction and mis-appreciation of law.91 The
court noted that the arbitrator correctly recorded expert evidence
from both sides but accidentally and erroneously attributed the
views of one party’s expert to that of another’s and vice versa, and
“as an exercise in judgment, he accepted the evidence of the
charterers’ expert and he does not have any second thoughts about
having done so.”92 Having accepted that evidence, he sought to give
effect to his acceptance in the award.93 That he did not succeed was
due solely to the accidental attribution of the evidence to the wrong
parties in his reasons, which he used as a tool in constructing the
See Pross Renovations Ltd. v. Lemay, 2010 BCSC 80, at paras 28–29, 39.
See Fuga AG v. Bunge AG, [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 192; Todd Petroleum Mining
Co. Ltd. v. Shell (Petroleum Mining) Co. Ltd., [2014] NZCA 507; Torch Offshore LLC v.
Cable Shipping Inc. [2004] 2 All ER 365 (QB), 28; Casata Ltd. v. Gen. Distrib.’s Ltd.
[2006] 2 NZLR 721 [112–117].
87 See Mut. Shipping Corp. v. Bayshore Shipping Co. of Monrovia Ltd., [1985] 1
WLR 625 (holding that a distinction should be made between an arbitrator having second
thoughts, which is not permissible, and the correction of an award to give effect to first
thoughts or intentions, which is permissible under the slip rule).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See Sutherland & Co., [1921] 1 KB 336, at 341; Food Corp. of India v. Marastro
Compania Naviera S.A. of Pan., [1987] 1 WLR 134.
91 See Mut. Shipping Corp., 1 WLR 625 n.43; Gannet Shipping Ltd. v. Eastrade
Commodities Inc. [2002] CLC 365; CLOUT Case 207, Sing. Int’l Arbit. Ctr., 6 Feb. 1998;
SIAC Arb. No. 6 of 1996.
92 Id.
93 Id.
85
86
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award.94 This seems to me to be a classic case of “error [in an
award] arising from any accidental slip [in the recording of material
contained in the reasons].”95 The court then allowed the arbitrator
to correct the award.96
In another case, the arbitrator initially calculated damages at the
date of termination of the agreement in question, but later
discounted them due to early payment.97 However, by the time the
award was issued, the agreement period of three years had expired
and the arbitrator decided to award damages without any discount
and with interest commencing from the date of the award’s
issuance.98 When the defendant requested a correction limiting
interest to post-award actions only, the arbitrator made it clear that
he had not intended to deprive the defendant of profits on claims
prior to the award.99 He thus proceeded to correct the award,
granting interest from the date when payment was due, instead of
on the basis of when the award was issued.100 The other party
disputed the propriety of the tribunal’s corrective action.101 The
court duly agreed, holding that the contested slip must “be an error
affecting the expression of the arbitrator’s thought, not an error in
the thought process itself”; therefore, the tribunal’s correction of the
date on which interest was due was neither a clerical, computational,
or typographical error.102 The arbitrator simply wanted to correct
his mistake, but he did not have the power or authority.103
Where available, the power of arbitrators to correct also extends
to the ancillary relief granted in the award. In Gamnet, the parties
agreed to demurrage at a value of 860 USD, but the arbitrator
included 21,858 USD of demurrage because of his misreading of
“some manuscript amendments made in the laytime calculations
submitted by the charterer.”104 The arbitrator amended the award

94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Id.
Id.
Id.
See CNH Glob. NV, 1 CLC 807, at P4.
See id. at PP5-8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 810ff.
See Gannet Shipping Ltd. v. Eastrade Commodities Inc., n.45.
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on the application of the charterer, and the correction was accepted
by the owner.105 He also amended the original costs, which reduced
the amount to be paid by the charterer by half, despite the fact that
there was no computational error in the costs.106 The court held that
the error in the amount of demurrage in the award was an accidental
slip because the arbitrator had not intended to use those figures. 107
It relied on Section 57(3)(a) of the English Arbitration Act, which
empowers arbitrators to correct the amount of an award as well as
any consequential corrections of costs because cost errors were the
result of “accidental slips” of award amounts.108 The court reasoned
that if the arbitrator were not empowered to correct the costs, then
if after correction the award amount were reduced under slip rule
from £1m to £1, then the only way for the correction of costs would
be Section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996, which would be
unfortunate because this route is expensive and engulfed in time
limits.109
The calculation of costs and whether their assessment is
erroneous is a persistent field that attracts requests for correction.
The claimant contended that the words appearing in Rule 28.1 of
the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) Rules by
which the parties may request the tribunal “to correct in the award
any errors in computation, any clerical or typographical errors or
any errors of a similar nature” are similar to Article 33(1) of the
Model Law, yet narrower than “accidental slip or omission,” which
appears in chapter 10 of the Singapore Arbitration Act, and which
in turn were interpreted by English courts to include “even errors in
a bill of costs due to mistake by solicitors representing a party.”110
The presiding arbitrator did not accept that “an error in computation
would include miscalculations, use of wrong data in calculations,
omissions of data in calculations and a clerical or typographical
error would include mistakes made in the course of typing or
drafting the award.”111 He further stated “the term ‘errors of a

Id.
Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See id.
110 See id. at 644, 650ff.
111 UNCINTRAL, Case Law on UNCINTRAL Texts, 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/16 (Mar. 19, 1998) [hereinafter UNCINTRAL Abstracts
105
106
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similar nature[,]’ if read as meaning errors of the ‘same kind[,]’
would also include errors or mistakes of commission, as well of
omission which had been inadvertently made or had never been
intended by the tribunal.”112 “Accordingly, the presiding arbitrator
considering that article 33 of the Model Law was best understood
as used in contradistinctions to errors of judgement, whether of law
or of fact, for which a tribunal is not empowered to correct,”
ultimately held that it possessed authority to correct the certificate
of costs.113
V. Interpretation of the Award
At the request of the parties or on its own initiative, the tribunal
interprets some points in its award.114 The consent of both parties is
mandatory for an effective request for interpretation.115 There may
well be situations where certain words or terms require the
tribunal’s particular interpretation or understanding; equally, it may
not be clear from the reasons listed by the tribunal whether a
particular claim has been dealt with in the award or alternatively
reserved for future determination.116 Similarly, the need for
clarification arises where the award’s reasoning is ambiguous as to
how a particular issue or claim was dealt with.117 In one case, for
instance, the arbitrator calculated the valuation of construction work
by adapting the approaches forwarded to it by the parties and
included therein numerous elements not put forth by the parties. 118

16].
112 Id.; see also Arnason v. Arnason, [2011] ABQB 393, ¶ 66 (Can. Alta. Q.B)
(holding “[m]athematical errors, or clear misunderstandings such as money that was
credited but proven not to have been paid” are matters susceptible to the correction
procedure).
113 UNCINTRAL Abstracts 16, supra note 111, at 2.
114 See UNCINTRAL Model Law, supra note 3, at art. 33(1)(b).
115 See Tay Eng Chuan v. United Overseas Ins. Ltd., supra note 55.
116 There have been many cases that reached these conclusions.
117 See generally Buyuk Camlica Shipping Trading & Industr. Co. v. Progress Bulk
Carriers Ltd., [2010] EWHC 442, ¶ 23 (UK Com.) (“[I]n relation to Reasons, Mr. Jones
says that it is that they are ambiguous or could be clearer”); see also an der Giessen-deNoord Shipbuilding Div. B.V. v. Imtech Marine & Offshore B.V., [2008] EWHC 2904, ¶
5 (UK Com.) (“GN contends that such shortness was not in this case a virtue because it
resulted in the Tribunal failing to address critical issues and defences and that that omission
has caused substantial injustice to it.”).
118 See Groundshire v. V.H.E. Const., [2001] EWHC 8, ¶ 77 (UK Com.).
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This included an 18 percent reduction in standing time cost 119 and
resulted in the award’s arguments and rationale being unclear.120
Similarly, Bulk Ship Union involved a monetary claim and interest
at a rate of 13.5 percent, in accordance with the English Late
Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998 (“1998 Act”).121
The tribunal awarded interest on that amount at a rate of five
percent, not under the 1998 Act but under section 49(3)(a) of the
Arbitration Act 1996.122 The High Court held that the claimants
were entitled to seek clarification regarding the applicability of the
1998 Act, because Section 57(3) of the English Arbitration Act
entitles them to do so in the event of ambiguity or absence of reasons
in the award.123 Unfortunately, the claimants failed to seek such
clarification from the tribunal and hence could not avail themselves
of Section 69 of the Arbitration Act.124
A. Notice requirements
Article 33 of the Model Law requires that, when a party applies
for a correction, interpretation, or for an additional award, it must
give the other party notice, so as to afford an opportunity to
contradict the assertions made in the application.125 The Singapore
Court of Appeal emphasized that the notice requirement included in
section 43(4) of the Singapore Arbitration Act and Article 33 of the
Model Law is “not simply an extension of the general rule” whereby
a party to arbitration needs to inform the other party when it
communicates with the arbitrator.126 This requirement, which
resulted from the standard of fairness, as enshrined in Article 18 of
the Model Law, implies that the other party should be given equal
opportunity to present its case on the claim presented for an
additional award.127
119
120
121

Id.
Id.
See Bulk Ship Union v. Clipper Bulk Shipping Ltd., [2012] EWHC 2595 (UK

Com.).
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 31.
124 Id. ¶ 32.
125 See UNCINTRAL Model Law, supra note 3, at art. 33(1)(b).
126 UNCINTRAL, Case Law on UNCINTRAL Texts, 6, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/157 (Jul. 9, 2015) [hereinafter UNCINTRAL Abstracts
157].
127 See id.; see also A. Samuel, Arbitration, Alternative Dispute Resolution Generally
122
123
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The notice requirement was emphasized in Anita Mantri, in
which the Delhi High Court held that arbitrators are bound to
conduct proceedings in accordance with the principles of natural
justice.128 It further stipulated that before rendering the additional
award, the tribunal was bound to provide notice and a right of
hearing to the appellant on the claim of the respondent.129 The Court
thus differentiated between subsections 1 and 4 of Section 33 of the
Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act.130 It stated that Section
33(1) of the Act was akin to Section 152 of the country’s Civil
Procedure Code; both provisions deal with corrections of
typographical or clerical errors, or any other error of a similar nature
in respect to awards and judgments.131 “Section 33(4) [of the Act]
is similar to section 114 and Order 47 [of the] Civil Procedure
Code,” which provide authority for claims or relief in respect to
matters wrongly omitted by the tribunal.132 The High Court was at
pains to illustrate that, because the award was named “additional”
and additional relief was ultimately granted, such relief fell in the
purview of Section 33(4) of the Act.133 The Court further stated that
“the peculiar facts of a case where the clerical or typographical error
or some other error is of such a nature that actually no notice was
required, may be in the facts of that case it can be said that a
correction can be made under Section 33(1) without notice.134
However, the same cannot be said of an application which is really
an application under Section 33(4) for the granting of additional
relief.”135
In the PetroChina case, the China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”) rendered an award
ordering Shandong to return sulfur to PetroChina136 and PetroChina
and the European Convention on Human Rights, 21 J. OF INT’L ARB. 413 (2004); M.A.
Kurkela & S. Turunen, Due Process in International Commercial Arbitration, (Oxford
University Press, 2d ed. 2010).
128 See Anita Mantri v. Karvy Stock Broking Ltd. & Anr. S, (2011) FAO No.
198/2007 (High Court of Dehli).
129 See id. ¶ 6.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 Id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 Id.
136 See id. ¶ 3.1.
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to reimburse the payment within 30 days of the date of award.137
PetroChina approached CIETAC with an application for a
supplemental award, requesting clarification on the order of
performance under the arbitral award.138 Meanwhile, Shandong
obtained an ex parte order from the court for the enforcement of
paragraph 1, without reference to the performance stipulated in
paragraph 2.139 In response, CIETAC imparted three letters.140 The
first two letters stated that PetroChina would reimburse Shandong
only after it returned the sulfur to PetroChina, thus confirming the
interpretation envisaged by PetroChina.141 In the third letter,
CIETAC stated that the first two letters constituted the
supplementary award.142 However, it is worth noting that both
PetroChina’s application and CIETAC’s response failed to notify
Shandong.143 PetroChina applied for the enforcement of this
award.144 The Court held that the letters breached the rules of
natural justice because they were issued without affording
Shandong an opportunity to be heard.145
VI. Correction of Awards through Tribunals’ Proprio Motu
Powers
Paragraph 2 of Article 33 of the Model Law empowers the
tribunal to correct the award on its own initiative (motu proprio)
within 30 days of the date of the award.146 This power is consistent
with the tribunal’s obligation to issue an award that is enforceable
and without faults that may lead to it being set aside.147
Furthermore, inasmuch as arbitrators may be held liable against the
See id. ¶ 3.
See id. ¶ 5.
139 See id. ¶ 4.
140 See id. ¶ 10.2.
141 See id. ¶ 5.
142 See id. ¶ 10.2.
143 See generally id. ¶ 10.3 (“On the issue of whether the Ex Parte order should be set
aside for material nondisclosure by Hongri, the Judge was satisfied there was no material
nondisclosure.”).
144 See id. ¶ 5.
145 Id. ¶ 46.
146 See UNCINTRAL Model Law, supra note 3, at art. 33(2).
147 In creating the UNCINTRAL Model Code, the General Assembly adopted the
recommendation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, done at New York, 10 June 1958. G.A.Res. 61/33 at 2 (Dec. 4 2006).
137
138
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parties, it is in their interest to correct the award on their own
motion, even if the parties do not detect the mistake.148 Not only do
the arbitrators owe a duty to issue an enforceable award that is not
amenable to being set aside, the arbitrators are also obligated to
ensure neither party is disadvantaged, even when the performance
of an obligation stipulated in the award is found to have been subject
to wrong calculations.149
A theoretical problem that may arise is whether the discretion of
the tribunal to correct its award may conflict with a right of the
parties not to have the award corrected. In practice, however, a
tribunal realizing the existence of a mistake will confer with the
parties and give them notice that it intends to correct the award.150
Usually, the correction of the award will be in the interest of the
prevailing party, in order to avoid a setting aside or a denial or
recognition and enforcement.151 Hence, the event of a tribunal
wishing to correct the award against the will of all parties involved
is relatively unlikely. If party autonomy was paramount and the
tribunal could not reach the winning party, the tribunal would have
to seek the consent of the losing party,152 who are not likely to be
forthcoming. Such an outcome would conflict with the pursuit of
commercial justice; in the event of a conflict between the duty of
the tribunal to offer an enforceable award, and the desire of the
winning party not to correct an erred award, the former should
necessarily prevail. Party autonomy does not dictate the content or
reasoning of the award on the part of the tribunal.153 These befall
the range of inherent powers of arbitrators, which serve the type of
commercial justice that the law expects from arbitral tribunals.154 In
this sense, arbitration should be no different than the courts.
148 Failure to act is grounds for terminating an arbitrators mandate. UNCINTRAL
Model law, supra note 3, at art. 14.
149 See id. at art. 18.
150 See id. at art. 33.
151 See generally Michael Ostrove et. all., Awards: Challenges, Global Arbitration
Review (Jan. 2, 2019), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-challengingand-enforcing-arbitration-awards/1st-edition/article/awards-challenges (“Courts . . .
reflect[] a broad consensus as to the merits of arbitral awards being final.”)
[https://perma.cc/35H7-RHNA].
152 See UNCINTRAL Model Law, supra note 3, at art. 33(1).
153 See id. at art. 28.
154 See Ilias Bantekas, Introduction to International Arbitration, 107-09 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2015).
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VII. The Request for an Additional Award
As already mentioned, the issuance of the final award is
traditionally deemed to render the tribunal functus officio.155 This
general rule, however, has been progressively mitigated in many
legal systems, which allows the tribunal (within certain limits) to
make an additional award.156 In New Zealand, an award could only
be reconsidered for matters omitted by the tribunal through an order
of the same court, assuming the court “considers the request to be
justified . . . .”157 To remove a deficiency, the tribunal was first
empowered to rectify any slips and errors, upon which the parties
were permitted under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Amendment
Act 1938 to make an application to the tribunal within 14 days of
the award, so long as the award did not deal with costs.158 Although
the New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996 did not repeal this provision,
more general powers were conferred on arbitrators through Section
33 of the First Schedule of the Arbitration Act 1996, which itself is
based on Article 33 of the Model Law.159 As has already been
mentioned, an additional award is possible (if a party makes a
request within 30 days of the original award) in respect of “claims
presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award.”160
It is therefore first of all necessary to determine the meaning of a
“claim” under Article 33 of the Model law.

A. No formal requirement to present “claim” for original

155 See generally Fidelitas Shipping Co. v. V/O Exportchelb, [1966] Q.B. 630, 644
(U.K. Com) (“An arbitrator’s authority is limited by stating a consultative case. Once he
has stated a case, he is a functus officio as regards the issues covered by the case.”).
156 See e.g., Arbitration Act 1890, s 9(b) (N.Z.) (granting powers to arbitrator
including “[t]o state an award as to the whole or part thereof in the form of a special case
for the opinion of the Court.”).
157 Arbitration Act 1996, s 33(3) (N.Z.)
158 See Arbitration Amendment 1938, s 14(2) (N.Z.). New Zealand’s Arbitration
Amendment Act of 1938 was inspired from the English Arbitration Act of 1889 and the
Arbitration Act of 1934. See Robert Burnard, The New Zealand Law Commission’s Report
on the UNCITRAL Model Law, 8 ARB. INT’L 3, 281 (Sep. 1 1992).
159 See Arbitration Act 1996 supra note 157 at art. 33; see also UNCITRAL Model
Law, supra note 3, at art. 33.
160 Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 157, at art. 33(3).
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and additional awards
Article 33(3) of the Model Law states that on the request of party
submitted within 30 days of the original award, the arbitrator can
make an additional award in respect of claims “presented in the
arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award.”161 Whether the
Tribunal has “dealt with” a claim in the award must be read in its
context.162 The judgment in Union Marine contains a useful
summary and references to cases decided on “claims” presented to
the tribunal, and whether such claims have been “dealt with.”163 In
Torch Offshore v. Cable Shipping,164 Judge Cooke explained
Section 57(3)(b) of the English Arbitration Act, “which uses the
word ‘claim’, [sic] only applies to a claim which has been presented
to a Tribunal but has not been dealt with, as opposed to an issue
which remains undetermined as part of a claim.”165 “‘Claim’ can
refer to a head of claim for damages or some other remedy, but not
to an issue which is part of the process by which a decision is arrived
at on one of these claims.”166 In equal measure, Colman J in World
Trade Corporation v. Czarnikow,167 emphasized that “‘claim’” does
not mean a submission in support of a relevant question of fact. It
means a claim for relief by way of damages, declaration or
otherwise, such as would have to be pleaded.”168
In Cadogan, it was held that no formality to present the claim
before the arbitrator in original proceedings is required.169 The
UNCINTRAL Model Law, supra note 3, at art. 33(3).
See Union Marine Classifications Serv. LLC. v. Comoros, [2017] EWHC 2364,
Issue 3 (Comm). For example, if a tribunal has not addressed the issue of jurisdiction but
has nonetheless definitively decided all the substantive claims of the parties, it is deemed
to have dealt with the interlocutory jurisdictional claim. See Ilias Bantekas, The Proper
Law of the Arbitration Clause: A Challenge to the Prevailing Orthodoxy, 27 J. of Int’l Arb.
1, # (2010) (“If a dispute incorporating these elements were eventually to proceed to
arbitration (and assuming the parties did not engage any local courts), the arbitrator would
only be asked to decide upon substantive legal issues and not procedural ones.”).
163 Union Marine Classifications Service LLC v. Comoros, supra note 162.
164 Torch Offshore LLC v. Cable Shipping Inc., [2004] EWHC 787 (Comm).
165 Id. at ¶ 27.
166 SC v. OE1, supra note 80, at ¶ 39.
167 World Trade Corp. v C Czarnikow Sugar Ltd., [2004] EWHC 2332 (Comm).
168 Id. at ¶ 14.
169 Cadogan Mar. Inc. v. Turner Shipping Inc., [2013] EWHC 138 (Comm) at ¶ 43
(“A claim is ‘dealt with’ in an award if it has been finally determined by it. Although the
dispositive part of the award is likely to be the most important part of the award for the
purposes of considering that issue, where, as is almost invariably the case, the written
161
162
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notion should therefore be construed in a broad and non-technical
fashion, also in light of the arbitration’s tendency to be less formally
constrained than court litigation.170 The important thing is that the
claim is before the arbitrator and this is considered as having been
achieved even if the claim is not presented in written pleadings or
submissions.171 In Cadogan, the High Court desired to give a nontechnical and broad construction to the term “claim” because
arbitration, as compared to litigation, is a less formal mechanism of
dispute resolution, whose focus is on substance rather than form.172
It stated further that:
A claim is “dealt with” in an award if it has been finally
determined by it. Although the dispositive part of the award is
likely to be the most important part of the award for the purpose
of considering that issue, where, as is almost invariably the case,
the written reasons form part of the award, the whole of the award
needs to be considered, and the dispositive part of the award
considered in the context of the written reasons.173

Additional awards enable parties to resolve disputes with the
tribunal arbitrator with completeness and without resorting to
courts.174 English courts have emphasized that it is desirable to
receive the cure arising from defects in awards from the arbitrators
themselves, rather than the courts.175 In Todd Petroleum, the New
Zealand Court of Appeal stipulated that “there is no support in the
statutory languages of either arts 33(3) or 34(3) [of the Model Law]
for a qualitative gloss on the nature of the request for an additional
award . . . [A]dding a qualitative requirement that a request under
art 33(3) be a ‘proper’ request would mean that a party would not
know whether it has made a request in terms of that article until the
arbitral tribunal either grants or rejects its application.176 Moreover,
reasons form part of the award, the whole of the award needs to be considered, and the
dispositive part of the award considered in the context of the written reasons.”).
170 See id. at ¶ 32 (“In my judgment this is an unduly narrow and technical
construction of the claims being made.”).
171 Id. at ¶ 22.
172 See id. at ¶ 32 (“This was an arbitration rather than court proceedings. Arbitration
is rightly a less formal process and concentrates on substance rather than form.”).
173 Id. at ¶ 43.
174 Torch Offshore LLC v. Cable Shipping Inc., [2004] EWHC 787 (Comm), at ¶ 24.
175 Id. at ¶ 28.
176 Todd Petroleum Mining Co Ltd. v. Shell (Petroleum Mining) Co Ltd., [2014]
NZCA at ¶ 37 per Stevens J (N.Z.).

2022

REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS

217

the notion of requirement for a proper request is inconsistent with
the language of art 34(4) which speaks only of a request being
‘disposed of’”.177
B. “Claim” presented, but omitted
As already mentioned, in order for the tribunal to make an
additional award, there must be a claim that was “presented,” but
“omitted,” from the original award.178 Conversely, a claim that was
not presented during the arbitration could not be adjudicated in an
additional award. Courts have held that, in case of disagreement
between the parties, it is up to the requesting party to prove that the
claim had indeed been presented.179 In Pirtek, for instance, a request
for an additional award concerning interest on the original award
was submitted to the arbitrator 17 months after the issuance of the
award, with the request being accepted.180 The subsequent award
was set aside because it violated the statutory limitation period and
also because the claim of interest was not raised before the arbitrator
in the original proceedings; clearly, a fresh claim cannot be raised
in request for an additional award.181 The High Court was adamant
that if there is a dispute as to whether a particular claim was
submitted for arbitral determination and which the arbitrator did not
address in the award, then the burden of proof is on the asserting
party to prove that such a claim was in fact presented in its statement
of claim or defence.182
An interesting question concerns whether arbitral costs can be
awarded in an additional award. The Supreme Court of New
Zealand stated that a tribunal is always expected to rule on the costs
of the procedure, unless the parties agree otherwise.183 Therefore, if
the original award does not deal with costs, the issue should be
considered as “omitted” and can be dealt with in an additional
award.184 Arbitral tribunals can make an additional award on an

177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id. at ¶ 37.
See Sinclair v. Woods of Winchester Ltd. and Another [2005] EWHC 1631 (QB).
Pirtek (UK) Ltd. v. Deanswood Ltd., [2005] EWHC 2301 (Comm) at ¶ 36.
But see id. at ¶¶ 33, 49.
See id. at ¶¶ 39-42.
See id. at ¶ 46.
Casata Ltd. v. Gen. Distrib. Ltd., [2006] 2 NZLR 721, [2006] NZSC 8 at ¶¶ 128-

129.
184

Id. at ¶ 4.
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issue presented before them but not dealt by them.185 In Pirtek, a
party’s request for an additional award in respect of a claim not
presented in its statement of claim was not accepted by the
tribunal.186 This is certainly good law and consistent with common
sense.
While considering the question whether the tribunal can award
costs in its additional award, none of which were claimed before the
final award was issued, the Supreme Court of New Zealand, in
General Distributors, stated that costs are always an issue that the
tribunal is bound to deal with, unless the parties agree otherwise. In
other words, the tribunal does not have the option as to whether it
should deal with the issue of costs because it has discretion on the
amount of costs to be awarded.187 If the issue of cost was raised
before the tribunal but the award is silent on this, this would be an
omission entitling the claimant to correction and an additional
award.
C. Arbitrator’s conscious “omission” of a claim
In some cases, a tribunal will omit a claim not because of a
mistake, but because of a conscious choice not to deal with claims
that fall outside of the jurisdiction of the tribunal, or which have
been rendered irrelevant by a decision on other claims. In these
cases, an additional award is generally not possible.188 In a case
involving an insurance claim, the tribunal first issued an interim
award on July 1, 2005 asserting its jurisdiction and ruling on several
other preliminary issues.189 In its award, the tribunal stated, “we
reserve our decision as to costs, how they shall be borne and who
shall assess them (except for the costs of the tribunal) until some
future occasion” and issued a decision on the costs of arbitration.190
The award further stated, “[it] is final as to what it decides. Any
remaining issues which we have to decide shall be determined on a
185 See Arbitration Act 1996, (1996), CURRENT LAW ch 2§ 57(3)(b) (stating that a
tribunal may “make an additional award in respect of any claim (including a claim for
interest or costs) which was presented to the tribunal but not dealt with in the award”).
186 See Pirtek (UK) Ltd. v. Deanswood Ltd., [2005] EWHC 2301 (Comm) at ¶ 49.
187 Casata Ltd. v. Gen. Distrib. Ltd., [2006] 2 NZLR 721, [2006] NZSC 8 at ¶ 3.
188 See VALE Australia Pty Ltd. v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., Case 414/2011 at ¶¶
81, 83(b) (March 30, 2012) (High Court of Delhi).
189 Sea Trade Maritime Corp v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda)
Ltd. (The Athena), [2006] EWHC 578 (Comm) at ¶ 4.
190 Id. at ¶ 7(99).
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further occasion if required.”191 In December 2005 (i.e. beyond the
statutory 56-day period) the tribunal made another award against the
defendant, Sea Trade, which then challenged the award on the
ground of expiry of the limitation period, further alleging that the
tribunal was functus officio after the July 2005 award.192 The award
was declared valid by the court, holding that Section 47 of the
English Arbitration Act 1996 confers general powers upon
arbitrators to deal with claims in parts and in different award.193
In a German case, the tribunal declined jurisdiction over the
controversy.194 The claimant challenged the award before the
German courts and, while the case was pending before the Supreme
Court, the tribunal rendered an additional award, awarding the
respondents the costs of the arbitration.195 The respondent applied
for enforcement, and the claimant resisted on the grounds that, inter
alia, the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to issue an additional
award because the setting-aside procedure concerning the final
award was still pending.196 The Supreme Court held that the tribunal
was not only competent, but was also required to rule on costs, and
“[a] declaration of enforceability of the first award was not required
for the issuance of the decision on costs.”197
VIII. Timelines for Requests to Correct, Interpret, or
Produce Additional Award
While applying for correction or interpretation of awards, both
the parties and the tribunal must strictly adhere to the timelines laid
down in Article 33 of the Model Law and implementing statutes of
the lex arbitri.198 Paragraph 1 of Article 33 stipulates requests for
correction and interpretation of awards, as well as requests for
additional awards, should be made within 30 days of the delivery of

Id. at ¶ 7(101).
See id. at ¶ 20.
193 Id. at ¶ 17.
194 United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Case L. on UNCITRAL Texts
(CLOUT): Case 663: MAL 16 (1); 33 (3); 34 (3), at page 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/61 (Feb. 5, 2007).
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 Id.
198 See UNCITRAL, supra note 3, at art. 33.
191
192
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the award, and in 60 days for additional awards.199
The question as to when the communication of a request for
correction or interpretation becomes effective has raised some
discussion. In Budhiraja, the petitioner requested the tribunal within
the statutory period of 30 days, but the request was not received in
the office of the arbitrator.200 When the petitioner came to know
that his application had not been received, he sent another for the
correction of the award, which was sent and thus received beyond
the 30-day limit.201 He naturally challenged the expiration of the
time limits in force.202 The Delhi High Court made the point that
the usual means of communication enjoy a presumption of delivery
under section 114(f) of the Indian Evidence Act.203 This
presumption is rebuttable because the surrounding facts may create
suspicion about the true receipt of the communication.204 The Court
relied on Harihar Banerji, in which the Indian Supreme Court held
that if a letter is properly posted, then it will be presumed to have
reached its addressee in proper time, in due course of postal
business, and been received by its intended addressee.205 It held that
the presumption is stronger if the sender has taken extra caution by
posting it through registered post and received either by the direct
addressee or someone acting on his behalf.206 The Delhi High Court
held that the petitioner sent the request through UPC (a private
courier service), thus presuming that such request reached the
arbitrator in proper time and in an appropriate manner; the
circumstances of the dispatch thus created a presumption of
delivery.207 Where a deadline for making a pertinent request has

Id. at art. 33(1).
Budhiraja Mining & Constructions Ltd. v. Ircon International Ltd. & Anr, (2012)
ILR 4 Delhi 273 at ¶ 2 (High Court of Delhi) (May 3, 2012).
201 See id.
202 See id. at ¶ 5.
203 See id. at ¶ 16.
204 See id.
205 See id; see also Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy, AIR 1918 at ¶ 18.
206 See Budhiraja Mining & Constructions Ltd. v. Ircon International Ltd. & Anr,
(2012) ILR 4 Delhi 273 at ¶ 16 (High Court of Delhi) (May 3, 2012).
207 See id. at ¶ 17. This principle was also applied in Samriti Devi & Anr v. Sampurna
Singh & Anr, AIR 2011 SC 773 at ¶ 22 (stating that “the presumption would apply with
greater force to letters which are sent by registered post, yet, when facts so justify, such a
presumption is expected to be drawn even in the case of a letter sent under postal
certificate”). Therefore, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, the letter would be
199
200
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expired the courts have, in exceptional circumstances, proved
willing to grant an extension.208 The possibility for an extension,
however, largely depends on the circumstances of the case and the
desirability of a clarification.209
A. Judicial attitudes over extension of timelines
In the event of expiry of the time limits for filing a request for
correction or interpretation, some courts, as noted in brief at the end
of the last section, have been inclined to extend the limitation
period. In Xstrata, which concerned a dispute submitted to the
LCIA, the tribunal issued an award ordering the buyer to pay the
claimant, but this was met by a refusal.210 The claimant applied for
the recognition and enforcement of the award in China because the
defendant was incorporated in China.211 The claimant’s application
was refused on the ground that ICRA, the fourth claimant, was not
a party to the main contract and the arbitration agreement.212 The
claimant applied to the LCIA for an additional award, or a
correction of the award in respect of ICRA, but the LCIA replied
that such a request was beyond the 30-day time limit set under its
rules and could only oblige if ordered by the courts of the seat.213
The claimant asked the Commercial Court of London to extend the
time limit using its powers under Section 79 of the English
Arbitration Act 1996.214 The Court observed that in the instant case,
the parties did not “otherwise agree” on a non-extension and

deemed to have reached it addressee (see Ram Murti v. Bhola Nath & Anr, 22 (1982) DLT
426 at ¶ 7; see also Madan Lal Seth v. Amar Singh Bhalla, 18 (1980) DLT 427 at ¶ 7; see
also Om Prakash Bahal v. A.K. Shroff, AIR 1973 Del. 39 at ¶ 4).
208 See, for instance, with reference to the English Arbitration Act. See Xstrata Coal
Queensland Pty Ltd. and Others v. Benxi Iron & Steel (Group) International Economic &
Trading Co. [2016] EWHC 2022 (Comm) at ¶ 48; see also Gold Coast Ltd. v. Naval Gijon
SA [2006] EWHC 1044 (Comm) at ¶ 44.
209 See SA Builders Ltd. v. Municipal Corp. of Delhi, EA No. 270/2002 in Ex. P. No.
99/1998 (High Court of Delhi) (19 February 2008) at ¶ 7.
210 Xstrata Cola Queensland Pty Ltd. v Benxi Iron & Steel (Group) international
Economic & Trading Co Ltd. [2016] EWHC 2022 (Comm)
211 See id. at ¶ 4.
212 See id. at ¶ 5.
213 See id. ¶¶ 22, 27. The provision in question was Art 27.1 LCIA Rules.
214 See id. ¶ 23. Section 79(1) stipulates that “[u]nless the parties otherwise agree, the
court may by order extend any time limit agreed by them in relation to any matter relating
to the arbitral proceedings . . . .” Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 79(1) (Eng.).
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proceeded to extend the time limit.215
The extension of the applicable limitation period is not part of a
generally accepted rule; it depends on the facts of each case and is
subject to judicial discretion. In S. A. Builder, the arbitrator gave an
award to the claimant on December 16, 1997, and held that the
claimant suffered a loss toward its business because of its inability
to use frozen assets.216 The award directed the respondent to pay
compensation and interest from April 1, 1990, to the date of
payment.217 The respondent challenged the award but failed.218
When the execution of the award was filed in the court, there was a
disagreement between the claimant and respondent on the amount
payable under the award because the claimant was calculating the
amount differently.219 The claimant argued that there was no clarity
as to whether the interest had been granted by the arbitrator under
Section 31(7)(a) of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, and
sought permission from the execution court to receive clarification
from the arbitrators.220 The court granted permission with a note
that this was in no way an authorization to re-examine the merits of
the application.221 The arbitrator issued an order of clarification
modifying the award and held that, under Section 31(7) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the tribunal can produce a “prereference period, [awaiting litigation] and post award.”222 The Delhi
High Court confirmed that even after the deadline has passed, the
parties can agree to extend this time period.223
B. Extension of time limits by order of the tribunal
Although tribunals may possess inherent power to extend
statutory deadlines on Article 33 applications filed directly to the
tribunal, this does not explain why a tribunal that has long disbanded

215 See Xstrata Coal Queensland Pty. Ltd. V. Benxi Iron & Steel (Grp.) Int’l Econ. &
Trading Co. [2016] EWHC 2022 (Comm) (Eng.) at ¶ 23.
216 See S.A. Builders v. Municipal Corp. of Delhi, ExP-99/98 of 2008, decided on
Feb. 19, ¶ 1 (Delhi High Court) (India) at ¶ 1.
217 See id.
218 See id. at ¶ 2.
219 See id.
220 See id. at ¶ 4.
221 See id. at ¶ 6.
222 Id. at ¶ 2.
223 See id. ¶ 6.
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and become functus officio should reassemble. Justice is as much
for the party whose interests were harmed by a faulty award as for
the other party who relied in good faith on that award and whose
legitimate expectations are now under threat. These are just some
of the considerations that guide or should guide tribunals in their
discretion of time limits. Indian courts have held that tribunals
cannot extend time limits on actions under Section 33(1), the
equivalent of Article 33(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, but can
extend time limits on actions under Section 33(6) of the Indian
Arbitration and Conciliation Act.224 Arbitration proceedings are not
terminated upon the lapse of time limits contemplated under Section
33(2) or (5) of the Act, as this is not required by Article 33(6) and
32 of the Indian Act.225 These principles emerged from one
application under Section 33 to the tribunal, in which the petitioner
objected to an extension of applicable time limits on the ground that
the tribunal cannot endlessly entertain a dispute.226 The court
rejected the plea and held that it cannot restrain arbitrators from
considering the matter.227
This was elaborated further in Ircon.228 There, the arbitrator
issued two awards on May 23, 2002, and the petitioner was directed
to make payments within two months.229 The respondent filed an
application for correction of computational and typographical errors
on June 18, producing a certificate of dispatch with the same date.230
The respondent acknowledged receipt on July 23 that payments had
been made to it.231 However, on July 22 the respondent sent another
letter to the arbitrator asking him to make a decision on his June 18
application.232 The petitioner received notice on July 30 from the
arbitrator concerning the respondent’s application for correction, to

224 See Nat’l Highways Auth. of India v. ITD Cementation India Ltd., OMP 455 of
2009, decided on Aug. 11, ¶ 10 (Delhi High Court) (India).
225 See id. ¶ 11.
226 See id. ¶ 12.
227 See id. ¶ 15.
228 See Ircon Int’l Ltd. v. Budhraja Mining & Constrs. Ltd., OMP 431/2003 &
432/2003 of 2007, decided on Sept. 24 (Delhi High Court) (India).
229 See id. ¶¶ 1–2.
230 See id. ¶ 2.
231 Id.
232 Id.
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which the petitioner replied on August 20.233 The respondent then
filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for
condonement of the delay in filing the application for correction.234
The arbitrator proceeded to issue an order on August 11, which
stated that he was out of his Delhi office and had not received the
June 18 application, having only received the application for
correction sent as a reminder on July 22.235 The arbitrator went on
to condone the delay in filing the application for correction by
invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act.236
On the basis of these facts, the court stated that Section 33 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act makes clear that, unless agreed
otherwise by the parties, the application for the correction award
must reach the arbitrator within 30 days of delivery of the award
and that it must be made with notice to the other party. 237 An
application to correct the award may be by any party, as well as by
the tribunal on its own motion (suo motu) within 30 days of the
issuance of the award.238 The Delhi High Court highlighted that
there are three types of time limitations pertinent to correction
applications: first, the applicant has to request for a correction
within 30 days of the delivery of the award; second, the arbitrator
has to make the correction within 30 days from the receipt of the
request; and, third, the tribunal can make the correction on its own
initiative with 30 days of the award.239 In the event of suo motu
correction, the 30-day time period starts when the award is issued,
not when it has been delivered.240
In Ircon, the application was made by the party.241 The High
Court emphasized that the timelines in Section 33 cannot be
extended unless provided by the statute itself.242 The extension is

Id.
Ircon Int’l Ltd. v. Budhraja Mining & Constrs. Ltd., OMP 431/2003 & 432/2003
of 2007, decided on Sept. 24, ¶ 2 (Delhi High Court) (India).
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See id. ¶ 5.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See Ircon Int’l Ltd. v. Budhraja Mining & Constr. Ltd., OMP 431/2003 &
432/2003 of 2007, decided on Sept. 24, ¶ 5 (Delhi High Court) (India).
241 See id. ¶ 2.
242 See id. ¶ 5.
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234

2022

REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS

225

allowed only under subsection 6 of Section 33, which stipulates that
the time limits pertinent to applications under subsections 2 243 and
5244 of Section 33 can be extended.245 In other words, the extendible
time is the one in which the tribunal must decide about the
correction of the award.246 The timelines within which the parties
must submit their application cannot be extended.247 Section 33
sufficiently reflects the legislature’s intent to allow extensions for
tribunals to decide on a correction, but not to allow extensions for
the submission of an application for correction.248 The High Court
further highlighted that there is no provision akin to Section 36(6)249
empowering the tribunal to correct the award beyond 30 days from
the issuance of the award.250 The Court concluded that where the
legislature intended the extension of time, it expressed its intention
clearly and therefore there could be no condonement for any delays
in the submission of an application for correction of an award by
invoking Section 5 the Limitation Act.251
C. Timelines for challenge and appeal after delivery of award
The timelines for challenging an award through an application
for correction, interpretation, or an additional award, starts from the

243 Subsection 2 says: “If the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under subsection (1) to be justified, it shall make the correction or give the interpretation within
thirty days from the receipt of the request and the interpretation shall form part of the
arbitral award.” The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §33(2) (India).
244 Subsection 5 says: “if the arbitral tribunal considers the request made under subsection (4) to be justified, it shall make the additional arbitral award within sixty days from
the receipt of such request.” Id. § 33(5).
245 See Ircon Int’l Ltd. v. Budhraja Mining & Constrs. Ltd., OMP 431/2003 &
432/2003 of 2007, decided on Sept. 24, ¶ 5 (Delhi High Court) (India).
246 See id.
247 See id.
248 See id.
249 Subsection 6 says: “The arbitral tribunal may extend, if necessary, the period of
time within which it shall make a correction, give an interpretation or make an additional
arbitral award under sub-section (2) or sub-section (5).” The Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, §33(6) (India).
250 See Ircon Int’l Ltd. v. Budhraja Mining & Constrs. Ltd., OMP 431/2003 &
432/2003 of 2007, decided on Sept. 24, ¶ 5 (Delhi High Court) (India).
251 See id. On the inapplicability of the Limitation Act on this point, see Yadav v.
Mishra, AIR 1974 SC 480 (India); Union of India v. Popular Constr. Co., AIR 2001 SC
4010, (2001) (India).
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date the tribunal has issued a new award or an order about the
application.252 Where “the grounds for challenge are known and are
not dependent upon the outcome of the application for clarification
then there is no good reason to postpone the running of the 28-day
period until the date of the corrected award. To do so would
unnecessarily delay the making of a challenge to an award. That
would be contrary to the aim and object of the [English Arbitration]
Act which is to promote the finality of arbitration awards.”253
Regarding one requirement in Section 70(2) of the English
Arbitration Act, the Commercial Court of London stated that the
ambiguous parts of the award should be severed from the unaffected
parts and that such unaffected parts should be treated without any
requirement of Section 70(2) mandating to have recourse under
Section 57 before initiating an appeal or challenge.254 Dealing with
the argument that the court must see the totality of arbitral decision
before dealing an appeal, the court stated that “[i]t certainly must
apply where the uncertainty or ambiguity has affected or may affect
that part of the result which is in question (and also perhaps in some
cases the reasoning leading to that result).”255
For the purpose of postponing the challenge timeline, the
application made should come in the purview of Section 33. For
instance, the court has held that the limitation period under Section
34 takes into account the time consumed by the arbitrator for any of
these three applications (correction, interpretation, and an additional
award).256 If the application is not among these, the limitation
period started from the date of original award.257 The court has also
held that, under Section 34(3), a party has to apply for the set aside
of the award within three months of receiving the award, and that if
application under Section 33 was made to the arbitrator, then a
three-month period will run after he received the award wherein
252 See, e.g., McLean Homes S. E. Ltd. v. Blackdale Ltd., [2001] EWHC (TCC) 830
[19] (Eng.); Aztec Constr. Ltd. v. Frocan Indus. Contractors Ltd., 1993 CanLII 7191 [10]
(Can. ABQB); Al Hadha Trading Co. v Tradigrain S.A. & Ors [2002] ArbLR 2 [61] (Eng.).
253 Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Eng’g Co. v. Songa Offshore Equinox Ltd. [2018]
EWHC (Comm) 538 [43] (Eng.).
254 See id. ¶ 28 (quoting Gbangbola v. Smith & Sheriff Ltd., [1998] 3 All ER 730,
736–37).
255 Id. (quoting Gbangbola, [1998] 3 All ER at 736–37).
256 See Sirkar v. Sirkar, AP No. 76 of 2014, decided on Mar. 13 (Calcutta High Court)
(India).
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Section 33 application was disposed of by the arbitrator.258
In this regard, the time for the delivery of award is of great
importance because this is the time when various timelines start,
like Sections 33(1), 33(4) and 34(3). For the purpose of these
timelines, when an award is considered to have been delivered was
discussed in State of Maharashtra.259 In this case, the arbitrator
issued an award in favor of the respondent and gave a copy of the
award signed by him on March 20, 2003.260 On account of nonpayment of costs by appellant, neither the original award nor its
copy was provided by the arbitrator.261 However, on March 29, the
respondent sent a copy of the signed award to the appellant.262
When the respondent continued to ask for the awarded money from
the appellant, the appellant said they were going to challenge the
award and requested the arbitrator give the signed copy of the award
to it on January 28, 2004.263 At the Indian Supreme Court, the
appellant contended that the challenge of an arbitral award was
beyond the three-month period given in Section 34(3) because the
award was provided to them by the arbitrator with too much of a
delay, while the respondent contended that they had provided the
appellant with the copy of signed award on March 29, which was
within the Section 34(3) period.264
The Supreme Court referred to Section 31(5), which mandates
the arbitrator to deliver the signed copy of award to each party. 265
Thus, the court concluded that what was to be delivered to each
party was the signed copy of award and not just any copy of the

258 See Todd Petrol. Mining Co. v. Shell (Petrol. Mining) Co. [2014] NZCA 507 at
[36] (N.Z.).
259 See State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders Priv. Ltd., (2011) 4 SCC 616, ¶ 11
(India). The Supreme Court of India found support on this point in Union of India v. Tecco
Trichy Eng’rs & Contractors. See id. ¶ 12. In Union of India, the Supreme Court held the
delivery of award to be a matter of substance and not of mere formality because, under
section 31, it is at this point that proceedings terminate. See Union of India v. Tecco Trichy
Eng’rs & Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239. Delivery of award to the party and receipt of
award by the party sets many limitation periods into motion like those given in sections
33(1), 3(4), and 34(4). See id.
260 State of Maharashtra, (2001) 4 SCC ¶ 3.
261 See id.
262 See id.
263 See id. ¶ 4.
264 See id. ¶¶ 7–8.
265 See id. ¶ 10.
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arbitral award.266 The court then concluded that the expression,
“party making that application had received the arbitral award,”
cannot be read in isolation and it must be understood in light of what
is said earlier in Section 31(5) that requires a signed copy of the
award to be delivered to each party. Reading the two provisions
together it is quite clear that the limitation prescribed under Section
34 (3) would commence only from the date a signed copy of the
award is delivered to the party making the application for setting it
aside.267
The Supreme Court held that because the appellant was not in
possession of copy of award, its application under Section 34 was
restored.268 However, when the timelines for the purposes of
Sections 33 or 34 have lapsed, Limitation Act 1963 cannot be
invoked for condonation of delay.269
If the award was served on a public holiday, that day would be
excluded from the limitation period of three months and 30 days.270
However, the limitation period would run from the day when the
award is received by someone who has knowledge of the arbitration
proceedings and understanding of the matter.271 In this case, the
award was received on Saturday and came to the table of the
executive engineer on Monday, therefore Saturday and Sunday
were not included in the reckoning of the limitation period due to
holidays and also for the delivery of the award.272
IX.

Form and Contents of Award
Finally, Article 33 of the Model Law contains a reference to
Article 31,273 which in turn sets forth some minimum requirements
of form and content for the arbitral award.274 Corrections and
266

See State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders Priv. Ltd., (2011) 4 SCC 616, ¶ 10

(India).
See id. ¶ 11.
See id. ¶¶ 17–18.
269 See State of Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Eng’rs, (2010) 12 SCC 210, ¶
4 (India).
270 See id. ¶ 7.
271 See id.
272 See id. ¶ 2.
273 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON INT’L COM. ARB.
(1985): WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, art. 33(5), U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4
(2008).
274 See id. art. 31.
267
268
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interpretations of awards, as well as additional awards, should thus
comply with the same requirements as the original award.275 This
rule is in principle uncontroversial; however, a distinction must be
drawn between those requirements of Article 33 that are always
relevant in this context, and those that may be relevant depending
on the type of additional ruling issued by the tribunal. More
specifically, there is no doubt that corrections, interpretations, and
additional awards should be made in writing and signed by (at least
the majority of) the arbitrators.276 It is equally clear that the date and
place of arbitration must be stated,277 and that a signed copy must
be delivered to each party.278
As far as the reasons are concerned,279 conversely, the
requirement changes depending on whether the tribunal issues an
additional award, a correction, or an interpretation. In case of an
additional award dealing with a portion of the merits that should
have been adjudicated in the original award, the reasons on which
the additional award is based should be spelled out with the same
level of detail as the original award. An additional award is, after
all, a decision on the substance of the dispute, and there is no reason
why it should contain a less encompassing reasoning than the
original award. In the case of a correction, the reasons may in some
instances be intrinsically evident in the type of amendments made
by the tribunal; the correction of a mere computational
typographical error, for instance, would not require an extensive
explanation. As for interpretations of the award, the purpose is to
provide clarity as to what the effects the tribunal intended to attach
to the original award; the requirement to give reasons, hence, is met
inasmuch as the tribunal provides sufficient information as to the
precise contours of the outcome of the dispute and, in particular, the
way in which the award should be complied with.
X. Conclusion
There is nothing more frustrating at the end of a lengthy arbitral

See id. art. 33(5).
See id. art. 31(1).
277 See id. art. 31(3).
278 See id. art. 31(4).
279 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON INT’L COM. ARB.
(1985): WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, art. 31(2), U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4
(2008).
275
276
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process than for the winning party to realize that the tribunal
miscalculated the amount of damages or interest due, or otherwise
infused the award with significant errors. Even clerical errors, such
as the name of the winning or losing party, will make it impossible
to enforce the award at the seat or elsewhere, not to mention more
substantive issues such as the parties’ unequal treatment by the
tribunal.280 In other cases, the tribunal may have forgotten to deal
with one of the parties’ claims, as was originally framed in their
statement of claim or defense. While arbitral statutes, local
arbitration laws, and international instruments, such as the
UNCITRAL Model Law, provide for remedies against such defects
in the body of the award, it is often disputed whether the error or
omission is a disguised claim against a point of fact or law with
which one of the parties fundamentally disagrees.281 Tribunals will
be reluctant to point out whether a particular request amounts to
such a disguised claim, in which case the party in question may
assess whether the error or omission falls within the grounds
available under the law of the seat to annul an award.
In all other cases, the general principle, based on the consistent
practice of states and national courts, seems to be that the subjective
interpretation of facts and the relevant law by the tribunal does not
amount to an error under the terms of Article 33 of the Model Law.
Requests for rectification are only available in respect of errors and
omissions that do not touch upon the subjective discourse of the
tribunal. In such cases, the parties may request the tribunal or the
courts of the seat to remedy the defects so that the award is rendered
meaningful for the parties. For this reason, it is important that the
parties adhere religiously to the time limits set out by their chosen
rules or the lex arbitri. No doubt, despite such timelines, it would
be detrimental to the rights of the winning party if a mistake is later
discovered. Hence, the timelines are not meant to punish the parties
for the lack of diligence, but to recognize that the tribunal becomes
functus officio shortly after the award is rendered. This is why some
arbitral institutions have made provisions for arbitrators to make
themselves available even after the usual timelines have elapsed.

280 See generally Ilias Bantekas, Equal Treatment of Parties in International
Commercial Arbitration, 69 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 991 (2020) (showing general
principles of equal treatment in international arbitral proceedings).
281 See, e.g., Ilias Bantekas, Party Autonomy and Default Rules Regarding the Choice
of Number of Arbitrators, 22 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 31, ## (2021).

